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A rapid deterioration in British railways’ financial results around 
1900 sparked an intense debate about how productivity might be 
improved. As a comparison it was noted that US railways were 
much more productive and employed far more detailed statistical 
accounting methods, though the connection between the two was 
disputed and the distinction between the managerial and 
regulatory role of US statistical collection was unexplored. 
Nevertheless, The Railway Companies (Accounts and Returns) 
Act was passed in 1911 and from 1913 a continuous, detailed and 
standardized set of data was produced by all rail companies 
including the London underground. However, this did not prevent 
their eventual amalgamation into the London Passenger 
Transport Board in 1933 on grounds of efficiency. This article 
finds that despite the hopes of the protagonists, collecting more 
detailed statistics did not improve productivity and suggests that 
their primary use was in generating publicity to influence 
shareholders’, passengers’ and workers’ perceptions.    
 
Introduction 
The productivity performance of British railways became a critical 
concern around 1900. Returns on shares had deteriorated rapidly 
throughout the previous decade, but 1900 was a turning point because of 
inflationary pressures associated with the Boer War and the outcome of 
the Smith and Forrest vs. The LNWR and Others case. The war precluded 
a return to profitability via falling commodity prices and the court 
judgement in favour of the appellants contesting a 5 percent increase in 
Statistics and London Underground Railways 
 
2 
Essays in Economic & Business History (forthcoming) Volume XXXVII, 2019 
railway rates by the LNWR (London and North Western Railway) meant 
that restoring operating margins by adjusting fares upwards was not 
feasible (Robert Irving, 1978). This specific anxiety had especial 
resonance because it correlated with broader fears about a crisis of British 
economic productivity against worldwide competitors, particularly the 
USA and Germany, and because railways were considered the key enabler 
of almost all other economic activity, especially exportable outputs (Avner 
Offer, 1991; George Paish, 1902). Some experienced contemporary 
commentators such as Sir George Gibb, Sir George Paish, Sir William 
Ackworth and Cyril Mossop proposed that until British railways began 
collecting detailed statistical information about their business as per the 
US example there could be no improvement in their management and 
productivity performance (Acworth and Paish 1912; Mossop 1911; Paish 
1902; UK Board of Trade 1909).  
In June 1906 the newly-elected Liberal government set up a nine-
member Board of Trade Committee to investigate these concerns. It held 
67 meetings and cross examined 29 witnesses, 25 of whom were senior 
executives in British, Indian, Canadian and Argentine railways. The 
remaining four represented the Civil Service and the railway shareholders. 
It reported in 1909, offering both arguments for and against increased 
statistical reporting (UK Board of Trade 1909). The three members of the 
committee who argued most firmly in favour of greater statistical detail in 
reporting (Acworth, Paish and George Peel) made several points. Firstly, 
existing accounts were not uniform in the recording and presentation of 
data. Secondly, the data were too sparse and more suited to a period in 
which the only items of interest in railway operation were the financial 
returns. Thirdly, railways now controlled many businesses other than 
railways which were not properly reflected in their accounts. Fourthly, 
according to those who favoured gathering more statistics, a business 
could not be adequately controlled or understood by its managers without 
more information than railways currently recorded. All these arguments 
concerned statistics as a function of better management of the railways. 
Those in favour of increased statistical measurement (Acworth, Paish and 
Peel now joined by Alfred Cole, George Stapylton-Barnes and Charles 
Fox) also advanced a set of arguments which broadly related to statistics’ 
regulatory function aimed at improving the railways’ image and 
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relationship with the outside world. Firstly, Acworth, Paish and Peel 
claimed that shareholders, alarmed by falling returns, now demanded 
better oversight of the companies in which they had invested. Secondly, 
passengers and their representatives in the Courts and in Parliament 
needed to understand better the railways’ true financial predicament before 
they passed damaging verdicts or legislation based on false assumptions. 
Thirdly, the rest of the world but especially America was overhauling 
Britain economically. By extension, there was a great deal that could 
learned and applied from the enormous advances in productivity that 
detailed account-keeping had allowed American railways to profit from 
(UK Board of Trade 1909).  
These views caused the nine-man Board of Trade committee to split 
three ways. Three members (Cole, Barnes and Fox) were content to 
endorse the proposal of extending the reporting and accounting duties of 
the railways. Three members (Acworth, Paish and Peel) stated that the 
proposals did not go far enough, and provided an appendix of additional 
information which they regarded as essential. Three other members 
(Walter Bailey, Charles Owens and George Whitelaw) wrote an extensive 
though repetitive set of reservations arguing that they saw no need for any 
additional accounting duties. The gist of their argument was that the 
expense would be too great (£35,000 per annum) and that “Practically no 
instance has been brought to our notice of any definite increase of earnings 
or decrease of expenditure in any specific case, which was the result of the 
use of the Ton Mile figures, and which could not, and ought not to, have 
been brought about by other means” (UK Board of Trade Report 1909: 
25).  
Nevertheless, the recommendations of the report, though not Acworth, 
Paish and Peel’s additions, became law in 1913 after the 1911 Railway 
Companies (Accounts and Returns) Act was passed. The Act required 
every railway company to submit a standardized financial account and a 
statistical return, the contents of which can be found at Appendixes One 
and Two. In this article we use data from four major underground railway 
companies: The Metropolitan and District Railway, The London Electric 
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Railway,1 The City and South London Railway and The Central London 
Railway. In 1913 the process of amalgamation between them had begun, 
though each company continued to file separate annual reports to the 
Board of Trade under The Regulation of the Railways Act 1871 (John 
Glynn 1984) until all of them, along with 100 or so smaller competitors 
from across the transport industry, were eventually merged into the 
London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB), a quasi-public corporation 
which provided all transport in London from 1933. Developments in the 
London underground network during this period can be found by 
comparing the maps shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
The particularly close connection of some of the key protagonists of 
the proposals for greater statistical information gathering to the 
management of London transport companies (Gibb and Acworth) and the 
American experience and connections of the architect of a unified 
transport system for London (Ashfield) mean that we can be confident that 
these methods were believed in and applied wholeheartedly and 
unreservedly from the top in the pursuit of improving London transport’s 
productivity. Evidence of this conviction can be found in the detailed 
accounts of the London underground railways companies from 1907 
onwards which give minute monthly breakdowns of earnings, expenses, 
passengers carried, mileage, equipment, property etc. long predating the 
legal requirement to do so.2 As Joanne Yates (1991) points out, these data 
collecting activities come at a cost which was evidently thought to be 
worth paying by the London underground railway managers. In view of 
these developments, the managerial and statistical stage was now set to see 
whether an improvement in railways’ productivity performance could be 
achieved by gathering more numbers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This consisted of an amalgamation of The Baker Street and Waterloo 
Railway, The Charing Cross, Euston and Hampstead Railway and The Great 
Northern, Piccadilly and Brompton Railways. 
2 London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), London Electric Railway 
Commercial Report, ACC-1297-LER-04 series. 
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Figure 1 
The London Underground Railway Network in 1913 
Source: © TfL from the London Transport Museum collection. 
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Figure 2 
The London Underground Railway Network in 1933 
Source: © TfL from the London Transport Museum collection.  
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Literature 
We begin by considering information and accounting history and the 
functions that statistics may play in organizations in terms of an external 
regulatory framework and the internal management of operations. Here 
there is a considerable academic literature. Paul Miranti’s works (Miranti 
1989 and 1990; Leslie Oakes and Miranti 1996; Nandini Chandar and 
Miranti 2005) on the Interstate Commerce Commission look at the how 
statistics were employed to construct a regulatory framework within which 
US railways were governed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Glynn (1984) does a similar though less detailed job for British railways 
in the same period. Yates (1991), Alan McKinlay, Chris Carter, Eric Pezet 
and Stewart Clegg (2010), McKinlay and John Wilson (2012) and Clegg 
(1994) examine how organizations may use statistics as part of their 
internal management systems. 
Glynn and Miranti find that the motivation for requiring companies to 
provide detailed statistical accounts in the nineteenth century had nothing 
to do with raising productivity. Instead, legislators wanted to provide the 
investing public with accurate information about the operations and 
prospects of the railway companies so that individuals were safeguarded 
from fraud and capital was allocated efficiently within the economy. This 
changed over time. Oakes and Miranti (1996) demonstrate that 
productivity and profitability became central to the arguments for 
statistical accounting in the early twentieth century. For example, Louis 
D. Brandeis claimed that US railroads could save a million dollars a day 
if they introduced scientific management and standard cost accounting. 
The railway companies disagreed and offered to pay Brandeis all the 
savings that his system achieved. Whatever the truth of the matter, the case 
caught the public imagination and sparked the ‘Efficiency Craze’ which 
lasted until US entry to the First World War.   
These studies encapsulate the shift in the discourse about the function 
of detailed statistical accounting from nineteenth century external 
regulation to twentieth-century internal management tool. Regarding the 
latter role, Yates (1991) explores how mass information was created and 
directly applied within organizations, noting that sometimes novelty 
trumped efficiency so that productivity gains were non-existent. 
Indirectly, Clegg (2004), McKinlay et al. (2010) and McKinlay and 
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Wilson (2012) focus on the workforce identities and managerial 
discourses that intensified statistical accounting methods created, 
concluding that detailed real-time statistical information was essential to 
create the disciplined employee required for mass production with 
commensurate gains for factory productivity. 
In summary, the literature on accounting history suggests that while 
statistics were intrinsic to establishing a tighter regulatory framework for 
railway companies and bought about clear changes in the quotidian 
rhythms of organizational management, their function in raising 
productivity and profitability was disputed. It might only have come about 
indirectly as a result of their managerial function in creating a disciplined 
force of employees out of a more autonomous group of hired hands 
(McKinlay and Wilson 2012). This is certainly plausible within the 
industries considered in that study, but we note that British railways in 
general, including the London underground, had no real need to create a 
well-disciplined corps of railwaymen as they had begun and completed 
that process long before manufacturing, making this an incomplete 
explanation for adoption and use of mass statistical accounting for the 
specifics of this case study (Peter Kingsford 1953).      
We turn now to the literature that holds that the function of 
information, both regulatory and managerial, is explicitly political. This is 
alluded to by Oakes and Miranti (1996) when they demonstrate that part 
of Brandeis’s appeal was that management by statistics offered apolitical 
neutrality in an era riven by political discord between left and right. 
‘Neutrality’ was also one facet of what George Gibb and his protégé Frank 
Pick had in mind when they advocated and then implemented the 
collection of statistics for London transport companies (Christian Barman 
1979). 
Theodore Porter (1995) theorizes the same on the basis of his study of 
the American and French Army Engineering Corps. He argues that the 
language of quantity has a quality of its own in that its supposed objectivity 
shields the organization from criticism. As Porter (1995, 8) notes: 
“Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. 
Objectivity lends authority to officials who have very little of their own” 
However, as Porter continues (1995, 85-86) this comes at price: 
“Quantification is a powerful agency of standardisation because it imposes 
Fowler 
 
9 
Essays in Economic & Business History (forthcoming) Volume XXXVII, 2019 
order on hazy thinking, but this depends on the license it provides to ignore 
or reconfigure much of what is difficult or obscure.”  
In common with other reviews this article does not intend to dispute 
either point (Trevor Pinch 1996; Matthew Wise 1996) but it does intend 
to try and reapply his arguments in a private sector setting in the UK. 
Though we consider that his contentions are reliable, there is some scope 
to extend their validity as Porter’s evidence is drawn primarily from either 
the US Army Engineering Corps in the 1940s or the French equivalent in 
the nineteenth century, a rather narrow evidential field in especially terms 
of sector but also in terms of nationality and time period. 
Keith Grint (2005; 2008) and Stephen Brookes and Grint (2010) tackle 
the issue from a different direction. In their view the purpose of statistics 
is not necessarily to apply them to a problem facing an organization, or to 
shield weakness or to impose standardization. Instead they may be used 
by decision-makers to reconfigure the perception of the problem in the 
minds of other decision-makers, service users or customers. Rather than 
uncertain officials answering their questioners with a fog of statistics, this 
argument is more suggestive of powerful elites confident enough to 
question the question, albeit in a subtle manner. Again, this article does 
not intend to dispute the point per se, merely to see if it stands the test of 
an alternative evidential setting. Grint’s work is situated primarily in his 
studies of the UK’s National Health Service in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. As with Porter his evidence is drawn from a public 
organization with an unavoidable commitment to public accountability. 
How officials might behave in a private organization less obliged to 
divulge information remains open to speculation. In summary, theories of 
the alternative applications of statistics in organizations are found to be 
well argued but would benefit from being applied in private sector case 
studies. 
Finally, moving to the London transport literature, reviewing what 
actually happened to productivity, profitability, management and 
regulation there is harder. The existing historical studies of London 
transport simply do not cover the productivity of the organization(s) to any 
significant degree (Theodore Barker and Michael Robbins 1976; Alan 
Jackson and Desmond Croome 1962; Christian Wolmar 2005). These 
focus primarily on the expansion of the network, technical and engineering 
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developments, industrial design and artwork, and the development of the 
suburbs and architecture. Some time is spent on discussing the financial 
history of London transport, and this can be used as a proxy with 
interpretive caveats for trends in productivity. But the fluctuating value of 
an activity is not necessarily correlated to the output as the contributors to 
the 1909 report were keen to point out (Acworth 1912). Moreover, the 
financial evidence presented by Barker and Robbins, Jackson and Croome, 
and Wolmar is relatively scanty and non-continuous. All authors admit 
that their work is for the generalist not the specialist reader.  
Thus the regulatory framework and management of London transport 
is discussed almost entirely in terms of progress towards a unified 
transport network. Amalgamation is held to have achieved some 
economies of scale and standardization, though fewer than expected 
(Wolmar 2005, 254-277). The workforce is found to have been well 
motivated, highly professional and had good relations with the 
management (George Johnston and Thomas Spates 1930; Hugh Clegg 
1950). No direct connection is drawn or discussed to the use of statistics 
and scientific management methods in achieving this outcome, despite 
their proponents making strong claims for both in the period (Arthur 
Lowes-Dickinson 1924; Herbert Morrison 1933). Nor are productivity 
statistics produced in support of either amalgamation or good labor 
relations as desirable outcomes.  
Regrettably, this absence in the canonical histories appears to be 
mirrored in the academic literature too. There is little to compare with the 
managerial, regulatory and financial studies of mainline railways by 
Michael Bonavia (1981), Glynn (1984), Anthony Arnold and Sean 
McCartney (2005), or Roy Edwards (2010). In the period, Cyril 
Hurcomb’s (1925) article avoids passing judgement on the issue by 
claiming that insufficient time has elapsed since the end of the First World 
War for the effects of the reliable application of statistics to make 
themselves felt. In conclusion, there are considerable omissions in the 
London transport literature on this topic, and the wider literature suggests 
an ongoing and lively debate on the function of statistics. Addressing this 
gap and offering a case study-based judgement on the function of detailed 
statistical accounting are contributions that this article makes to business 
history.  
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Contribution to Business History 
In the absence of extensive work on this topic in the London transport 
field, this article intends to answer two questions: Firstly, did productivity 
improve after 1913 in the wake of the accumulation of detailed statistical 
evidence concerning the operation of London’s underground railways? 
Secondly, if it did not, what was the true purpose of this exercise? As 
discussed earlier, did gathering statistics have internal managerial value in 
its own terms for the railway industry, or was it done for regulatory reasons 
because it was realized that the industry had to defend itself against 
external critics in the courts, parliament, trade unions and shareholders’ 
associations?  
Answering the first question can be achieved relatively simply and 
quantitatively via archival records. In doing so this article expands what is 
known about London’s transport history. Answering the second question 
allows us to explore how statistics were used in the regulatory and 
managerial spheres, and whether their ‘neutral’ status was in fact highly 
politically charged. By doing this we can construct a hypothesis about the 
function of statistical reporting in a historical organization which devoted 
considerable resources to that task, but the outcomes and motives of which 
we currently know relatively little.     
 
Methods 
This article is the evaluative history of London transport. In this case 
study, theories will be confronted with detailed historical evidence to test 
their explanatory power and identify limitations (Mairi Maclean, Charles 
Harvey and Clegg 2016). While this case study is of a single instance, the 
primary data are considered continuously over two decades which we 
argue is sufficient to overcome anomalies and rebut the charge of 
exceptionalism (Marcelo Bucheli and R Daniel Wadhwani 2014). The 
primary sources were identified by archival search in the archives most 
pertinent to organizations in question, Transport for London archive 
(hereafter TfLA) and the London Metropolitan Archives (hereafter LMA). 
Data are presented from 1913 (the implementation of the Railway 
Companies (Accounts and Returns) Act 1911) to 1932 (the year before the 
formation of the LPTB). The secondary sources were identified by study 
of the relevant journals, articles and following their citations. The 
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quantitative figures and clear definitions of the terms of railway 
productivity from the primary and some secondary sources provide the 
theoretical lens and the conceptual vigour of organization studies. This can 
be married to a historical interpretation of the past through secondary 
sources as a subjective process and thus elements of synthesis and dual 
integrity from both history and organization studies can be achieved.  
Maclean et al. (2016) also discuss representational truth, contextual 
sensitivity and theoretical fluency as principles of the same creative 
synthesis. Methodologically, this article does not seek to provide an 
absolute positivist proof, not least because historical specificities 
undermine attempts to provide universally applicable answers. 
Nevertheless, ‘Representational’ truths about the historical operation of 
organizations can be arrived at, particularly when the primary evidence is 
situated within well-defined business principles and theories such as 
passenger/ton mileage, traffic density, situational leadership theory etc. 
which lend a theoretical fluency to the analytical process.  
     
Findings–The Use of Statistics to Boost Productivity 
The main service of a railway is transportation, which involves the 
carriage of quantity for distance. The multiplication of one of these factors 
by the other represents the most basic building block of measuring the 
service performed, and the terms to express the results are passenger miles 
and ton miles (Mossop 1911). Due to the nature of London transport, this 
article deals with passenger miles. Normally this is achieved by 
multiplying the number of passengers by the number of train miles run, 
but the high standards of statistical exactitude implemented by the London 
transport companies are immediately apparent since they calculated 
mileage by car (carriage) rather than by train. Multiplying these figures 
gives results in the order of trillions. More succinctly, a different 
calculation allows us to see how many passengers were carried for each 
mile each piece of rolling stock moved. Table 1 below shows a clear 
pattern which is that the latter part of the First World War produced a spike 
in passenger journeys against a stable number of car miles run. After 1919, 
however, London underground railways became less productive, falling 
below the 1913 levels from 1924 onward. Fewer and fewer passengers 
were being conveyed for every mile run by their rolling stock. Evidence  
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Table 1 
Passenger Journeys and Car Mileage on London Underground Railways, 
1913-32 
 
Year Passenger 
Journeys 
 (000s) 
Car Miles 
Run 
(000s) 
Average Number of 
Passengers  
Carried per Car Mile 
1913 250,394 48,526 5.16 
1914 251,247 48,410 5.19 
1915 256,313 50,957 5.03 
1916 287,884 52,726 5.46 
1917 340,510 55,099 6.18 
1918 381,726 54,767 6.97 
1919 399,824 55,841 7.16 
1920 402,595 63,202 6.37 
1921 338,038 58,082 5.82 
1922 324,970 58,448 5.56 
1923 305,249 57,378 5.32 
1924 297,425 58,896 5.05 
1925 318,022 65,437 4.86 
1926 309,333 65,398 4.73 
1927 342,883 79,005 4.34 
1928 368,232 81,108 4.54 
1929 391,529 83,482 4.69 
1930 403,404 85,286 4.73 
1931 394,885 84,197 4.69 
1932 376,946 85,669 4.40 
 
Source: London Metropolitan Archive, ACC-1297-04-065.Underground and 
London Traffic Statistics Book No. 1. 
Note: For the purposes of simplicity and continuity in interpreting the archival 
records, London Underground Railways are taken to be The Metropolitan and 
District Railway, London Electric Railways, The City and South London Railway 
and The Central London Railway. 
 
from Table 2 corroborates this from a slightly different angle. This shows 
the total number of passengers carried daily by each item of rolling stock 
in service. Despite peaks and troughs in the overall daily number of 
passenger journeys, the trend in the ratio of inputs to outputs with which 
the London underground railways were transporting passengers was 
increasingly unproductive.    
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Table 2 
Passengers Carried per Car per Day on London Underground Railways, 
1913-32 
 
Year Passenger Journeys 
Per Day (000s) 
Average Cars in 
Service per Day 
Average Number of 
Passengers Carried 
per Car per Day  
1913 686 978 701 
1914 688 - - 
1915 702 - - 
1916 789 - - 
1917 933 - - 
1918 1,046 - - 
1919 1,095 1,137 963 
1920 1,103 1,178 936 
1921 926 1,062 872 
1922 890 1,110 802 
1923 836 1,103 758 
1924 815 1,097 743 
1925 871 1,123 776 
1926 847 1,095 774 
1927 939 1,307 719 
1928 1,009 1,358 743 
1929 1,073 1,453 738 
1930 1,105 1,490 742 
1931 1,082 1,523 710 
1932 1,033 1,609 642 
 
Source: See Table 1.  
 
While output is one way of considering a railway’s services, it is 
certainly not the only way. From an investor’s perspective, the attraction 
of a hypothetical railway that carries 1,000 tonnes of gold 1,000 miles 
daily over a railway that carries 1,000 tonnes of stone the same distance is 
obvious given the current relative value of gold and stone, although their 
physical productive outputs in tonne miles are identical. Clearly the 
relationship between the revenue derived from the load to the cost of 
conveyance, the operating ratio, is critical to railway operations. The 
London underground railway companies collected more data relating to 
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this issue than any other. Some of this is displayed below in Table 3. This 
shows that nominal receipts and costs per passenger both rose 
considerably during the war period, but in the immediate postwar world 
costs rose far more rapidly than revenues posing a serious threat to the 
operating ratio. In the late 1920’s and early 1930’s costs fell steadily 
though receipts remained stable, allowing the operating ratio to regain 
some, but not all, of its 1913 margin. Adjusting for inflation simplifies the 
narrative: over the period receipts per passenger fell by 18 percent, costs 
rose by 6 percent.    Whatever productivity trends on passenger mileage 
London’s underground railways were producing, their ability to extract net 
revenue from their loads was diminishing. All in all this should not have 
produced conditions in which investors’ financial interests could have 
been expected to flourish. Curiously, Table 4 shows that this was not the 
case. In fact, shareholders, especially holders of ordinary shares, had 
reason to be steadily increasingly cheerful over the entire period. The 
primary reason for the increasing amount of capital available to pay 
dividends despite a poor productivity record on the railways lies in the 
operation of the ‘Common Fund’ or financial pooling arrangement which 
all the London transport companies entered into during 1915. This allowed 
profits from transport companies with low fixed costs (buses) to be 
transferred to those with high fixed costs (railways). Secondarily, we can 
note that poor productivity does not necessarily result in the absolute 
amount of net income falling provided that the organization(s) expand fast 
enough. It is true that the London underground railway companies would 
have had even more net income available out of which they could have 
paid dividends if they had been able to carry more passengers per mile 
than they did. But even though the effectiveness of their use of rolling 
stock diminished, we can infer that the sheer volume of growth in 
passenger traffic, probably as a product of the growth of London’s 
population and greater affluence in the Home Counties in this period, was 
sufficient to tide their net revenue over (Barker and Christopher Savage 
1959; Julian Greaves 2005; Robert Millward and John Singleton 1995).  
Overall, we find that the London underground railway companies 
failed to improve their productivity during a period of economic 
uncertainty in the First World War, the recession of 1920-22 and the onset 
of the Great Depression 1929-32. They failed not only to carry passengers 
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more efficiently as a ratio of physical inputs to outputs, but they also failed 
to improve the ratio of revenue to costs involved in the carriage of that 
traffic. Counter-intuitively, this failure corresponds to a period in which 
financial returns, the cause of the original fears about railway productivity 
around the turn of the century, steadily improved.   
 
Table 3  
Passenger Receipts, Operating Costs and Operating Ratios, 1913-1932 
 
Year Average 
Receipt 
per 
Passenger 
(Pence) 
Average 
Receipt 
Adjusted 
for 
Inflation 
Average 
Operating 
Expenses per 
Passenger 
(Pence) 
Average 
Operating 
Expenses 
Adjusted for 
Inflation 
Operating 
Ratio 
1913 1.72 1.72 0.87 0.87 51 
1914 1.71 1.72 0.92 0.93 54 
1915 1.89 1.67 1.12 0.99 59 
1916 1.89 1.36 1.16 0.84 61 
1917 1.93 1.04 1.15 0.62 60 
1918 2.01 0.85 1.28 0.54 64 
1919 2.27 0.86 1.60 0.61 70 
1920 2.52 0.81 2.17 0.69 86 
1921 3.1 1.08 2.39 0.83 77 
1922 3.1 1.23 2.11 0.84 68 
1923 2.85 1.20 2.09 0.88 73 
1924 2.86 1.21 2.14 0.91 75 
1925 2.79 1.18 2.06 0.87 74 
1926 2.82 1.20 2.25 0.96 80 
1927 2.85 1.24 2.17 0.95 76 
1928 2.87 1.25 2.05 0.90 71 
1929 2.86 1.26 1.96 0.86 69 
1930 2.85 1.29 1.84 0.83 65 
1931 2.87 1.36 1.90 0.90 66 
1932 2.91 1.41 1.89 0.92 65 
 
Source: See Table 1. 
Notes: Operating ratio (author’s calculation) = Average Operating Expenses per 
Passenger x 100/Average Receipt per Passenger.  Adjustments for inflation are 
calculated by the author at RPI, constant 1913 prices (Measuring Worth, 2019). 
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Table 4  
Average Returns on all Classes of Shares Paid out of Revenue, Net 
Income, Amount Available to Pay Dividends and Amount Derived from 
Pooling on London Underground Railways, 1913-1932 
 
Year Average 
Return 
(%) 
Net 
Income 
(£000s) 
Amount Available 
to Pay Dividends 
(£000s) 
Amount Derived from 
the Operation of the 
Common Fund (£000s) 
1913 2.7 1,141 220 Nil 
1914 2.5 1,112 178 Nil 
1915 2.5 1,180 312 271 
1916 3 1,336 394 345 
1917 3 1,684 428 354 
1918 3.2 1,793 513 430 
1919 3.1 2,061 425 335 
1920 2.8 1,782 315 241 
1921 4 1,479 726 649 
1922 4.1 1,871 958 772 
1923 4.1 1,583 1,005 751 
1924 4 1,504 934 615 
1925 4 1,604 882 633 
1926 4.2 1,392 866 609 
1927 4.5 1,726 1,030 788 
1928 4.5 1,948 1,215 887 
1929 4.5 2,173 1,233 870 
1930 4.5 2,384 1,255 874 
1931 4.4 2,283 1,179 776 
1932 4 2,318 923 510 
 
Source: See Table 1. 
 
Having discounted the existence of productivity improvements in the 
areas of physical output and financial efficiency as a result of more 
detailed record keeping, this leaves us with one final medium through 
which to assess the activities of the London underground railways: their 
social utility. This is not directly related to productivity, but it plays an 
important role in shaping the public and political perceptions alluded to 
earlier in the Brandeis case and by Porter (1995) and Grint (2005; 2008) 
in theorising about the management of opinion.  
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Tim Leunig (2006) considers that the social saving from railways is 
the minimum additional amount that society would have to pay to do what 
the railways did without them. The railways’ social saving therefore 
measures the fall in wider national resources required to provide a given 
level of output, and the social savings are a measure of the contribution of 
technological change to productivity growth. Leunig’s method of 
quantifying that social saving is to express it as the time saved by an 
individual travelling by rail as opposed to other previous means, typically 
walking, riding on horseback or by stage coach and then multiplying it up 
by estimates of the value of one hour of a worker’s time. In London’s case, 
the well-documented congestion means that we need only consider 
average walking speed (2.5mph) as the comparator. Tables 1 and 5 show 
that in 1913 passengers made 250,394,459 journeys at an average speed 
of 17.3mph. On those figures 18,905,000 hours of time were saved. By 
1932 passengers made 376,945,606 journeys at an average of 20.5mph, 
giving an impressive 68 percent rise to 31,852,000 hours of time saved. 
Even if the number of journeys is held constant, the rise in average speed 
still generates an additional approximate total of 2,300,000 hours.   
The headline fact is that London underground railways moved more 
passengers faster and thus generated increasing social savings for the 
wider economy in both absolute and relative terms. However, Leunig 
admits that assigning a monetary value to the time saved is a problematic. 
Examples cited by him vary from 4.5 to 8 pence per hour in the mid-
Victorian period (Dionysius Lardner 1855; Terry Gourvish 1980). 
Nevertheless he finds them to be significant, estimating that they were 
worth 5 percent of GDP in 1865 and 14 percent of GDP in 1912.3 This 
article eschews placing any specific value on the time saved by London’s 
underground railways, but notes in general that London s population grew 
very slightly as a proportion of the rest of the UK from 17 percent to 17.5 
percent in the period 1911-1931, that the incidence of unemployment was 
always 5-15 percent lower than in other UK regions (excluding the wider 
South East) after 1920 and that average productivity and incomes were 
                                                          
3 Nominal UK GDP was £34 per capita in 1865. By 1912 it was £51 per 
capita. Since cumulative inflation between those dates was just -0.07% the values 
are directly comparable (Measuring Worth 2019).    
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appreciably higher than average UK ones (Stephen Broadberry 1986; 
Greaves 2005; Peter Scott 2007). Overall, we infer that London 
underground railways’ social savings to the London economy were 
significant. Whether they were a productivity measure used by 
management is debatable, but increasing speeds undoubtedly played a role 
in generating good publicity. We will return to this function of statistics as 
a tool to influence opinion later. 
 
Table 5 
Average Speed on London Underground Railways, 1913-1932 
 
Year Average Speed 
(mph) 
1913 17.3 
1914 16.6 
1915 16.5 
1916 16.5 
1917 16.5 
1918 16.5 
1919 16.1 
1920 16.1 
1921 16.1 
1922 16.1 
1923 17.7 
1924 18.3 
1925 18.1 
1926 17.7 
1927 17.7 
1928 19.2 
1929 19.2 
1930 19.6 
1931 19.5 
1932 20.5 
 
Source: See Table 1. 
 
In summary, we find that the increasing volume of statistics coincides 
with a period of decreasing rather than increasing productivity in terms of 
physical output on London’s underground railways, and that there is a 
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similar trend in revenues versus costs. Nevertheless, pooling revenues and 
a generally buoyant and expanding market allowed dividends to rise. The 
hopes of Paish, Acworth, Gibb and Ashfield in the value of statistics were 
misplaced, but crucially the origin of their fears was dispelled.  
However, before closing the case on the data enthusiasts we should 
consider five questions. Firstly, but for the increased collection of 
statistics, would productivity have been even worse? The issue here is that 
apart from the evidential problems with counterfactual history, even if it 
could be proved that accumulating more data slowed the rate of decline 
statistics were not the solution that they were purported or needed to be. 
Clearly the railways’ structural productivity problems went deeper than 
data collection could remedy. A measure that was intended to improve 
matters was not even able to stabilize them.  
Secondly, did the fall in productivity 1913-32 have a different external 
cause(s)? In this case, whatever the varying economic conditions and 
uncertainties faced by the London underground railways, the trend of 
diminishing productivity is essentially steady. Over twenty years 
circumstances come and go, but decline is un-arrested. Hurcomb’s plea in 
1925 that the fruits of statistical labor today would create more 
productivity jam tomorrow could only be credible for so long.  
Thirdly, was the new regime after 1913 for statistical gathering still 
too incomplete in its scope to be effective? We know that Paish, Acworth 
and Peel considered the breadth of the provisions for gathering statistics 
in the 1911 Act, to be incomplete, and that this view is echoed by Mossop 
(1911), who regarded some statutory extension of the terms as being 
essential.  These additions consisted of recording the engine hours, the 
wagon/carriage mileage, passenger mileage, density of traffic, 
goods/passenger carriage loads and passenger/ton mileage (UK Board of 
Trade 1909). However, the close involvement of the enthusiasts for 
statistical measurement as a management tool in London transport meant 
that all these additional measures were built into their record keeping. 
Regrettably for them, it still bought about no improvement in productivity.  
Fourthly, if the statistics were gathered as a function of regulation, 
were they put to actual managerial use? Earlier we saw that Yates (1991) 
documented cases where statistical recording of certain phenomena 
continued to occur even after senior management had indicated that it no 
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longer served any purpose, and systems of accounting were the product of 
inertia or novelty value. Evidence from the archives offers examples in 
London transport where statistics were the basis for fare setting, 
negotiations with trade unions or shareholders and used as the justification 
for the provision of services and the construction of new lines.4 It seems 
fair to conclude that statistics did play some direct function in managerial 
decision-making, but that raising productivity remained unsolved. 
Fifthly, were the statistics categorically counting the wrong thing? The 
railways delivered tremendous welfare gains to travellers and society that 
were not easily captured in financial terms (Leunig 2006). Irving (1978) 
suggests that from 1870, railways reacted to their increasingly poor image 
in the eyes to the public by concentrating on the effectiveness of their 
services in providing what the public wanted, rather than maximising their 
efficiency in input–output terms. If, despite the protestations of its 
supporters, the true function of statistical gathering lay away from 
productivity improvement, we should explore some alternative purposes 
for the collection of statistics by an organization. To that end we will now 
consider the management of opinion.  
 
Findings–The Use of Statistics to Influence Public Discourse 
Having discounted the generation of productivity enhancements, the 
use of statistics by the management of London transport may be better 
explained by accepting elements of several other propositions. Previously 
we saw in Oakes and Miranti (1996) that statistics–or their absence–were 
used as a stick to beat US railway companies and point out their failings 
in a highly successful publicity campaign. They emphasized that an 
otherwise dry set of statistical debates in the case was only energized by 
Louis Brandeis’ extensive media contacts. This then generated a society-
wide ‘efficiency craze’ for several years which drew in organizations 
which had no industrial function such as churches, schools and 
households. We can infer then that in this period statistics were potentially 
                                                          
4 TfLA: Fixing a Fare LT 1182-2, The Problem of the Fare 1413-01, Wage 
Comparisons from 1914 LT 353-221, Annual Reports of The Metropolitan 
Railway LT 103-01 series, Pick-Ashfield Business Correspondence LT 527 
series. LMA, Proposal for the Thames River Boat Service ACC-1297-LPT-01-
009-037. 
Statistics and London Underground Railways 
 
22 
Essays in Economic & Business History (forthcoming) Volume XXXVII, 2019 
a very powerful weapon in controlling or shaping public opinion. Much of 
their resonance in the period lay in the perception that statistics were 
‘neutral’. This supports Porter’s (1995) argument that organizations use 
statistics to give a simulacrum of objectivity in decision making because 
they are too weak to justify their decisions to external actors on the basis 
of their own professional subject matter expertise.  
Lastly, we note that the challenges which public service organizations 
have to deal with may be primarily political or social constructs not 
susceptible to positivist de-construction (Grint 2005). In this 
interpretation, in order to be successful, the role of senior management is 
to successfully reinterpret the problem facing the organization in the minds 
of the major stakeholders. In other words, rather than answering the 
question–which may not have an answer–they need to change the question 
(Brookes and Grint 2010). The role of statistics remains important, but 
their function is to   influence the perceptions of regulators rather than 
changing managerial processes. 
 
Public Perceptions of London Underground Railways 
If railways in general had a somewhat tarnished image by the 1900s 
(Irving 1978), then London’s underground railway owners’ image had 
suffered especially badly. In 1902 maladroit manoeuvring between 
American financiers Charles Yerkes and J.P. Morgan had caused the 
failure of a major tube railways scheme (Barker and Robbins 1976). In 
1904, the main shareholder in the parent company of the Baker Street and 
Waterloo (Bakerloo) Railway committed suicide in the Royal Courts of 
Justice after being convicted of major fraud. As well as taking poison, he 
was found to have had a loaded revolver in his pocket while in court 
(Stephen Halliday 2004). In 1907, the tortuous financial system which had 
sustained The Underground Electric Railways of London Company 
(UERL) collapsed, and its entire debt had to be restructured (Jackson and 
Croome 1962). 5 Confidence in the integrity of the owners of London’s 
                                                          
5 This company later amalgamated with a succession of bus and tram 
companies, and by the 1920s it had become the principal provider of transport in 
London. Its chairman (Lord Ashfield) and vice-chairman (Frank Pick) later 
assumed those same posts in the LPTB. 
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underground railways had taken a terrible series of blows, and at the end 
of the First World War members of parliament were prepared to say in the 
House of Commons that London transport was secretly controlled by 
German financiers who were ‘Hook nosed patriots’ that sang ‘God save 
the King’ in broken English (the House of Commons debate 1920). Public 
confidence in the management and leadership of London’s underground 
railways was very low indeed, amply fulfilling Porter’s hypothesis that a 
retreat into the use of ‘objective’ statistics by management was likely. 
It was widely held that confidence in industry in general in the 
uncertain post war economic climate could be restored by a better public 
understanding of the financial facts upon which arbitration between 
workers, managers, consumers and owners could be based. These facts 
were naturally based on gathering statistics, and yet again, the Americans 
were found to be ahead in the publicity game (Lowes-Dickinson 1924). 
More specifically in the case of transport, there was strong movement to 
professionalize the industry. It was hoped that this would ensure that 
decisions were made on the basis of objective evidence and that ‘scientific 
management’ principles were employed. This was epitomized by the 
creation of the Transport Institute in 1920 (Kevin Hey 2010). 
All these measures were designed to restore public and employee 
confidence in the industry and had statistical information as the basis for 
rational, quantitative-based decision-making at their core. Owners’ 
intuition had become synonymous with corruption and inefficiency. 
Instead, managers would now gather all the facts and figures. Once they 
were known then the action required should be clear, or at the very least 
the action taken would be defensible. Thus the reputation of London 
transport’s senior management could be rescued by a discourse located in 
statistics which claimed the efficient reconciliation of the competing 
claims of the consumer, the worker, the owner and the manager in the 
operation of industry (Lowes-Dickinson 1924).  
   
Statistics as a Defense against Regulators 
We have seen how the primary motive for the introduction of more 
detailed statistical accounting for railways in the nineteenth century was 
to facilitate their regulation so that investors were better protected against 
fraud. This regulatory burden steadily deepened and widened with 
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successive Companies Acts, and the state also widened its interests to 
include those of passenger safety, comfort and economy. Due to these 
increasing requirements the railway companies began to collect statistics 
of their own. This was in order to defend themselves against regulation 
arising out of cases in courts and legislative change (Miranti 1989).  
From 1907 onwards, the chief threat against which Lord Ashfield and 
the senior management of the UERL wished to defend themselves was 
governmental or municipal takeover. For a variety of reasons, the political 
forces propelling those proposals were seriously hampered and divided 
(Edmund Dell 2000; James Chandler 2007). This did not mean though that 
if London transport were managed badly that it would remain inviolate, 
and in any case several attempts were made by the London County Council 
(LCC) and in Parliament to municipalize or nationalize London transport 
in the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s.  
In the event, Ashfield and Pick almost entirely had the better of it. 
Jackson and Croome point out that proposals for the LCC to buy the 
UERL’s debt in 1907 were defeated as were their proposals to run 
municipal buses and tubes in 1920.6 In 1915 London underground 
railways remained outside direct government wartime control. In 1921 
proposals for the reorganization of London transport from a committee 
under the chairmanship of William Kennedy-Jones, the member of 
parliament for Hornsey in London, were defeated, with Lord Ashfield 
playing a key role. In 1924, in spite of the protests about the quasi-
monopoly status that Lord Ashfield’s transport ‘Combine’ had now 
achieved, the government legislated to stop the spread of small private 
‘pirate’ bus companies which were undermining the revenues of his 
organization (Morrison 1933, 54-81). 
The ‘pirate bus’ episode offers the opportunity to explore a short case 
study where statistics were used in an explicitly political manner by the 
London transport combine. The 1919 Select Committee report on London 
transport noted that the Combine was already forcibly making the 
statistical case that small competitors were driving down revenues.7 It is 
                                                          
6 TfL Archives, LT-346 series. 
7 TfLA, The 1919 Report of the Select Committee on Transport in the 
Metropolitan Area. LT-370-03.  
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clear that the explosion of small private bus companies was carefully 
documented by the Combine in the years following the First World War.8 
Their performance, finances and activities were noted, and then used as 
the basis for stories, usually casting them in a negative light, which then 
appeared in the press.9 There was tacit co-operation between big business 
(the Combine) and large trade unions (the Transport and General Workers 
Union) to eliminate small scale competition as noted by Morrison (1933). 
This pincer movement was based on statistical proof of falling revenues 
and falling wages and in 1924 it was successful in getting the London 
Traffic Act passed which dramatically curtailed competition (Clegg 1950).   
This process was taken to its logical conclusion with the creation of 
the quasi-public corporation the LPTB in 1933. This is held to be the 
apotheosis of Ashfield and Pick’s careers. They became the unrivalled 
masters of the management of London transport (Wolmar 2005). 
Commentators at the time and subsequently have attributed this 
achievement at least in part to their overwhelming command of 
information which allowed them decisive advantages in contests with their 
critics. Frederick Menzler, the LTPB’s Chief Financial Officer 
commented: “Of Pick, it could be said without sarcasm, that he knew all 
the answers ... In this connection his handling of statistics, though often 
brilliant, was at other times shattering to the self-respect of his advisors.”10 
In a similar vein, his comment on Lord Ashfield was that he suffered from 
a sort of ‘divine discontent’ which resulted in him constantly reviewing 
and urging the review of reports, policies and practices.11 Elsewhere, Lord 
Latham, Chairman of the LCC and later of the London Transport 
Executive emphasizes the same themes: “Both [Pick and Ashfield] had the 
supreme quality of never being satisfied or complacent about their 
achievements. Mr Pick in particular was responsible for the evolution of a 
whole gamut of statistical controls which ... still provide the basis many of 
the methods we employ today.”12 
                                                          
8 LMA, ACC-1297-UER-04-065. London Transport Statistics. 
9 TfL Archives, LT 346-001, Press Cuttings. 
10 TfLA, LT1172-013. Lord Ashfield and the Public Corporation, 7. 
11 Ibid, 6. 
12 TfLA, LT248-181, Efficiency in London Transport, 3. 
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It is clear that neither man was satisfied until he was the master of his 
brief. Would be critics and regulators soon discovered that they could not 
rival their command of the figures.13 Evidence from Pick and Ashfield’s 
business correspondence and the views of their contemporaries offer a 
compelling record that statistics were important ammunition in 
counteracting their critics, especially in Parliamentary committee or in the 
press. Pick’s mentor, Gibb, had likened them to an essential quarry or an 
arsenal, and the records are replete with evidence of the frequency and 
effectiveness with which Pick and Ashfield brought them to bear.14  
The evidence from the period also points towards a movement in the 
management of London transport from a position of weakness at the end 
of the First World War towards an elite of powerful influencers of wider 
opinion by the 1930s. As Pick himself observed in 1936: “The London 
Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) is a new experiment in administration 
... authority is vested in a small group of seven people selected for their 
knowledge and experience–a kind of aristocracy of business ... these seven 
people are practically beyond control.”15 The evidence from the early 
1920s demonstrates that the use of statistics was a keystone of defense 
against regulators as Miranti and Porter (1995) would suggest.16 Later, the 
evidence shows that over time it became more than just a defense. By the 
1930s Pick’s speeches indicated that the LPTB’s unaccountable 
managerial elite were confident enough to openly describe themselves as 
                                                          
13 For example, see transcripts from TfLA, LT493-080 Conference of The 
London General Omnibus Company and the Transport Workers Federation, 
October 14, 1921, and LT571-034 Report of the proceedings at the meeting of 
London members of parliament and The Rt Hon Lord Ashfield, March 3, 1920. 
14 TfLA, LT 249-182, Accountancy in a Large Scale Industrial Organisation; 
LT249-181, Efficiency in London Transport; LT345 Series, Articles published by 
Pick-Ashfield; 
LT1172-019, Record of the Second Annual Conference of Members and 
Officers of the London Passenger Transport Board–1937. 
15 London Transport Museum Archives, B6 Box 5. Frank Pick Speech at 
Oxford 1936, 1.  
16 The National Archives, Kew, London, MT36/1 The Formation of a London 
Traffic Authority; MT36/10 The Proposed Structure of a London Traffic 
Authority. 
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such.17 That they could make these claims and retain the confidence of the 
public, shareholders, minsters and trade unions in their ability to be the 
appropriate guardians of an enormous public utility says much about their 
aptitude in shaping perceptions.    
 
Statistics as a Mechanism for Shaping Public Perceptions  
Appropriately, the shaping of public opinion began with an extensive 
positive publicity campaign post 1907 run by Pick (Barker and Robbins 
1976). He was a firm believer in the necessity of detailed statistical 
information in running an organization (Barman 1979). The first move in 
Pick’s publicity strategy was the standardization of signage, information 
and design across a disparate network to make the London underground 
railways and transport in general immediately recognisable. The 
ubiquitous roundel was soon in evidence across London followed by the 
famous Beck map (Barman 1979; Ken Garland 1994). He then advocated 
using colourful simple designs with innovative fonts in a series of poster 
campaigns, many of which have become artwork icons (David Lawrence 
1994; 2000).  
A small minority did directly presented statistics relating to London 
transport operations, notably the progress of the New Works projects in 
the 1930s. Most depicted pastoral scenes, suburbia or London’s 
attractions. However, in common with the mainline railways, much of this 
latter type of ‘bucolic’ publicity also directly or indirectly emphasized 
speed, convenience, safety, punctuality, and economy (Colin Divall 2011; 
David Ashford 2013). All these claims could only be substantiated by 
recourse to statistics. Finally, as well as the direct presentation of statistics, 
domestic idylls and tourist attractions there was a ‘social realist’ school of 
poster which portrayed imposing technology, rugged workers and power 
stations. This ostensibly had nothing to do with statistics. However, we 
suggest that it was nevertheless part of creating an image in the public 
mind of an organization that had embraced the application of scientific 
methods to progress and achieving efficiency which was entirely 
                                                          
17 London Transport Museum Archives, B6 Box 5. Frank Pick Speeches to 
the London School of Economics 1935 and at Oxford 1936. 
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commensurate with or indeed dependent upon statistical analysis (Hey 
2010). 
As well reassuring the public that their transport was safe in the hands 
of experts, there was another set of actors who also had to be placated or 
persuaded to actively hand over power to a managerial elite. These were 
the financial owners, trade unions and politicians at various levels of 
government. Statistics proved useful in each case, but in the main 
politicians proved the easiest to persuade. As Chandler (2007) and Offer 
(1981) demonstrate, Conservative politicians were keen to remove the 
provision of public services from democratic control at both municipal and 
national level. Thus, experts wielding ‘apolitical’ statistics as a basis for 
decision making as opposed to voters awarding themselves ever-growing 
public services at the expense of local taxpayers seemed ideal managers. 
Organized labor was equally in awe of experts in this period, albeit for 
different reasons. A fair society obviously required rationality in the way 
in which resources were allocated. This would be achieved through 
centrally gathering statistics which experts could then fruitfully employ 
for the greater good as opposed to the wastefulness of competition (Dell 
2000, 77-100). 
Shareholders and trade unions proved harder to persuade but, with 
politicians already won over, they were left to dispute the terms of the 
agreement to create the LPTB with LPTB managers rather than the 
agreement to hand over power itself. Evidence shows that London 
Transport handled their claims on a case by case basis, each instance 
heavily backed up by recourse to statistics.18 Managerial elites 
occasionally lost battles to these interest groups, but they had already won 
the war of perceptions which had granted them control of private 
monopoly in the first place. In summary we suggest that while the direct 
employment of statistics in publicity campaigning was not nearly as 
prominent as in committee or legal work it was nevertheless a pervasive 
and essential background to the organizational image that London 
transport’s mangers were seeking to create. 
                                                          
18 TfLA, LT374 Series, Compensation Claims by Former Owners; LT493 
Series, The 1937 Bus Strike; LT 653 Series, Publicity Relating to Stock Prices. 
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Conclusions 
This article began by asking whether the increasing detail with which 
statistics were compiled by London’s underground railways had the 
promised effect of improving measures of railway productivity in a period 
of economic uncertainty. We find that the answer is a conclusive no. 
However, when the value of railways’ services is interpreted more widely 
to include social value then there is evidence of improvement. However, 
this function is related to the management of regulatory opinion. The use 
of statistics as a managerial function appears to have failed. 
Thus, we come to the second debate over what other function, if any, 
statistics played. We find that there is a strong case for the use of statistics 
both as a defense against direct attempts to regulate and also to shape 
qualitative public perceptions of London transport, thus forestalling 
further regulation before it was even posited. The use of statistics is most 
notable in the against criticism but it was also visible, though more subtly, 
in the positive publicity campaigns run to persuade society that London 
transport was managed by a small elite who could be trusted to act 
scientifically, objectively and efficiently. 
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Appendix One: Financial Accounts Required of Railway Companies by The 
Railway Companies (Accounts and Returns) Act 1911. 
 
No. 1 (a). Nominal Capital authorised, and created by the Company. 
No. 1 (b). Nominal Capital authorised, and created by the Company jointly with 
some other Company.  
No. 1 (c). Nominal Capital authorised, and created by some other Company on 
which the Company either jointly or separately guarantees fixed dividends.  
No. 2. Share Capital and Stock created, as per Statement No. 1 (a), showing the 
proportion issued. No. 3. Capital raised by Loans and Debenture Stock.  
No. 4. Receipts and Expenditure on Capital Account. No. 4 (a). Subscriptions to 
other Companies. No. 5. Details of Capital Expenditure for year ending  
No. 6. Estimate of further Expenditure on Capital Account.  
No. 7. Capital Powers and other Assets available to meet further Expenditure on 
Capital Account.  
No. 8. Revenue Receipts and Expenditure of the whole Undertaking.  
No. 9. Proposed Appropriation of Net Income.  
No. 9 (a). Statement of Interim Dividends paid.  
No. 10. Receipts and Expenditure in respect of Railway working.  
ABSTRACT A.-Maintenance and Renewal of Ways and Works.  
ABSTRACT B.-Maintenance and Renewal of Rolling Stock- (1) Locomotives. 
(2) Carriages. (3) Wagons.  
ABSTRACT C.-Locomotive Running Expenses.  
ABSTRACT D.-Traffic Expenses.  
ABSTRACT E.-General Charges.  
ABSTRACT F.-Expenses of Collection and Delivery of Parcels and Goods.  
ABSTRACT G.-Running Powers. Receipts and Payments in respects of Running 
Power Expenses. ABSTRACT H.-Mileage, Demurrage, and Wagon Hire.  
ABSTRACT J.-Jointly owned and jointly leased Lines. Receipts and 
Expenditure. 
No. 11. Receipts and Expenditure in respect of Omnibuses and other Passenger 
Vehicles not running on the Railway. 
No. 12. Receipts and Expenditure in respect of Steamboats.  
No. 13. Receipts and Expenditure in respect of Canals.  
No. 14. Receipts and Expenditure in respect of Docks, Harbours, and Wharves.  
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No. 15. Receipts and Expenditure in respect of Hotels, and of Refreshment Rooms 
and Cars where catering is carried on by the Company.  
No. 16. Receipts and Expenditure in respect of other Separate Businesses carried on 
by the Company. No. 17. Electric Power and Light Account.  
No. 18. General Balance Sheet.  
 
Appendix Two: Statistical Returns Required of Railway Companies by The 
Railway Companies (Accounts and Returns) Act 1911. 
 
1. Mileage of Lines-  
(A).-Mileage of Lines open for Traffic.  
(B).-Mileage of Lines authorised but not open for Traffic.  
(C).-Mileage of Lines run over by the Company's Engines.  
II. Rolling Stock-  
(A)-Steam Locomotives and Tenders.  
(B)-Rail Motor Vehicles.  
(C)-Trains worked by Electric Power.  
(D)-Coaching Vehicles (other than Electric).  
(E)-Merchandise and Mineral Vehicles.  
(F)-Railway Service Vehicles, and Horses for Shunting.  
III. Horses and Road Vehicles employed in the Collection and Delivery of Parcels, 
Goods, and Passengers.  
IV. Steamboats.  
V. Canals.  
VI. Docks, Harbours, and Wharves.  
VII. Hotels.  
VIII. Land, Property, &c., not forming part of the Railway or Stations.  
IX. Other Industries (if any).  
X. Maintenance and Renewal of Ways and Works (Abstract A).  
XI. Maintenance and Renewal of Rolling Stock (Abstract B).  
XII. Engine Mileage.  
XIII. Passenger Traffic and Receipts.  
XIV. Goods Traffic and Receipts.  
XV(A). Tonnage of the Principal Classes of Minerals and Merchandise carried by 
Goods Trains. XV(B). Number of Live Stock carried by Goods Trains.  
XVI. Summary of Financial Results secured in comparison with those for past 
Years.  
Certificates of the Responsible Officers as to the Upkeep of the whole of the 
Companies' Property. Auditor's Certificate. Index. Map.  
 
